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ARThuR J. hOLmES
WAS ThE uNITEd KINgdOm’S pOLIcy 
OF puShINg FOR ThE RETuRN OF ROhINgyA 
 REFugEES TO myANmAR FOLLOWINg EThNIc 
cLEANSINg  IN 2017 REALISTIc?
A b s t r a c t
This article explores the United Kingdom’s response to the 
Rohingya Crisis which began in August 2017, resulting in the 
ethnic cleansing of 600,000 Rohingya Muslims in the first nine 
weeks of violence, with a minimum of 6,700 people being 
killed in the process. The United Kingdom reacted with con-
demnation, and began immediately calling for the safe return 
of refugees who had fled the violence, to their homes in Ra-
khine state, Myanmar. Using the testimony from Mark Field 
MP, Minister for Asia, in a Foreign Affairs Committee meet-
ing, this essay assesses this policy of pushing for the return 
of the Rohingya to their homes. Using primary sources avail-
able to Britain at the time its policy was formed, this essay 
argues that Britain’s approach was not  only unrealistic with 
regards to providing an environment in which Rohingya refu-
gees would be provided safety, but also in relation to Bur-
mese authorities’ desires to take back Rohingya refugees. 
Myanmar’s campaign of ethnic cleansing intentionally created 
the environment in which either the Rohingya would never 
return, or they would return to state-controlled concentration 
camps. Secondary material expires the history of violent state 
policies against the Rohingya in Myanmar, and Britain’s policy 
is shown to not only be unworkable due to such policies, but 
would actively endanger those refugees  who chose to return. 
Key  words: Rohingya; Myanmar; Britain; ethnic nationalism; 
genocide; ethnic eleansing; foreign policy
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czy pOLITyKA WIELKIEJ BRyTANII W KWESTII pOWROTu uchOdŹcÓW 
ROhINgIA dO BIRmy pO czySTKAch ETNIczNych W 2007 ROKu   
ByłA REALISTyczNA?
S t r e s z c z e n i e
Artykuł omawia kryzys, który rozpoczął się w sierpniu 2017 roku i spowodował czystki etniczne obej-
mujące około 600 000 muzułmanów z ludu Rohingya, przy czym w pierwszych 9 tygodniach gwał-
townych zamieszek śmierć poniosło co najmniej 6700 osób. Zjednoczone Królestwo potępiło czystki 
i natychmiast wezwało do umożliwienia uchodźcom bezpiecznego powrotu do ich domów w Birmie. 
Na podstawie wyjaśnień ministra ds. Azji Marka Fielda, członka parlamentu, Komitet ds. Spraw Za-
granicznych na swym posiedzeniu dokonał oceny tej polityki, polegającej na nakłanianiu ich do po-
wrotu do Birmy. Opierając się na źródłach dostępnych w Wielkiej Brytanii w chwili, gdy tworzyły się 
zręby tej polityki, autor eseju dowodzi, że ten kierunek polityczny był nie tylko nierealistyczny w od-
niesieniu do możliwości zapewnienia uchodźcom bezpieczeństwa, ale także sprzeczny z zamiarami 
władz Birmy w kwestii przyjęcia uchodźców. Burmańska kampania czystek etnicznych świadomie 
stworzyła sytuację, w której Rohingya nigdy nie powrócą bądź wracaliby do kontrolowanych przez 
państwo obozów koncentracyjnych. Dostępne opracowania analizują historię przemocy wobec lud-
ności Rohingya w Birmie i ukazują politykę Wielkiej Brytanii nie tylko jako nieskuteczną z powodu ta-
kich posunięć politycznych, ale także wskazują, że zagrażałaby ona życiu decydujących się na powrót 
uchodźców. [przeł. Jacek Serwański]
S ł o w a  k l u c z o w e: Rohingya; Birma; Wielka Brytania; nacjonalizm etniczny; ludobójstwo; czystka 
etniczna; polityka zagraniczna
In August 2017, an attack on Burmese border guards by the Arakan Rohingya Salva-tion Army (ARSA) was met with what the Myanmar (Burmese) government descri-bed as ‘clearance operations’ in Rakhine state. This campaign entailed brutal attacks 
on Myanmar’s minority ethnolinguistic Muslim population in Rakhine—the Rohingya.1 At 
least 6,700 people were killed and over 600,000 Rohingya fled across the Naf river into 
neighbouring Bangladesh in the first nine weeks (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2017, Q71). 
This campaign included mass killings, rapes, mutilations and the razing of hundreds of 
villages formerly occupied by the Rohingya minority. The ‘crackdown’ as described by 
the Myanmar military was alternatively defined by the United Nations (UN) as ethnic cle-
ansing, and a leading voice in condemning this campaign was the United Kingdom (“UN 
human rights chief points to ‘textbook example of ethnic cleansing’ in Myanmar”, 2017).2 
The UK, a permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and former colonial 
ruler in Myanmar, had close ties to Burmese history and the plight of the Rohingya. This 
essay will assess Britain’s response to the ethnic cleansing which was most explicitly 
outlined in a Foreign Affairs Committee meeting, in which the British government voiced 
its desire for the voluntary, internationally observed return of the Rohingya to Bangladesh 
(Foreign Affairs Committee, 2017, Q69).
1 The term ‘Rohingya’ has become politicised and contested by the Myanmar authorities, who deny the 
Rohingya rights to citizenship and have even denied their existence as an ethnic group. The Rohingya are 
clearly identifiable by their language, which has Indo-European roots, opposed to the official Sino-Tibetan 
language of Myanmar. They have been persecuted more than other minorities in Myanmar mainly as a result 
of their Islamic faith.
2 Myanmar’s military is split between the political National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) and the 
armed forces, or ‘Tatmadaw’.
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A number of issues need to be addressed to allow this essay to precisely critique 
Britain’s policy. Firstly, the term ‘realistic’ will refer to not only the plausibility of this policy 
being implemented in Myanmar, but also the plausibility of it being done in a way which 
ensured a secure and dignified future for the Rohingya—one which the Rohingya themsel-
ves were likely to accept. Britain made it clear in outlining its policy that these were its prio-
rities, and by utilising historical analysis of the Rohingya’s situation in Myanmar alongside 
an examination of what the August 2017 ethnic cleansing entailed, an informed conclusion 
can be made. Secondly, violence against the Rohingya is ongoing at the time of writing, yet 
this essay will refer only to events and sources which existed prior to the 23rd November 
2017 Myanmar-Bangladesh agreement on repatriation. The bilateral agreement was des-
cribed as an essential step in solving the Rohingya crisis, and this date ensures that only 
primary material available to policymakers at the time is used to assess their decisions.
Secondary source material on this topic is relatively limited, and further historical inqui-
ry into Myanmar’s treatment of the Rohingya needs to be undertaken. That being said, 
years of reports by journalists and a handful of academic papers on life in Myanmar for 
the Rohingya prior to August 2017 can be used to shed light on how they had been sub-
jected to a decades-long campaign of state-level stigmatisation, persecution and violence 
before ethnic cleansing began. Issues regarding domestic politics in Bangladesh, ARSA 
insurgency, human trafficking of refugees and the potential application of the terms 
‘apartheid’ and ‘genocide’ all add to the discussion on Rakhine, yet this essay will focus 
purely upon Britain’s approach to the crisis as an episode of ethnic cleansing.3
Evidence provided in this essay shall show that the chances of Rohingya voluntarily 
returning, or even being allowed to return to Myanmar, were minimal, if not non-existent. 
It will show Britain’s policy to have been unrealistic. How and why Britain came to form 
this policy will be explored, before the perspective of Burmese authorities is explained in 
order to highlight the flaws in Britain’s approach. Opinion on repatriation from the Rohin-
gya perspective is also analysed in oder to give a voice to the Rohingya themselves—so-
mething British policy seemingly ignored.
Myanmar continued to the time of writing to deny access to international investigators 
and humanitarian organisations, yet consistent stories and reports flowed out of Rakhine 
state from the moment this phase violence started in August 2017. It is this evidence 
that shall be used to judge whether or not Britain’s policy was realistic. 
BRITAIN’S AppROAch: REpATRIATINg REFugEES
During an inquiry by the UK’s Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC), Mark Field MP, British 
Minister of State for Asia and the Pacific, spelled out the government’s approach to the 
violence in Rakhine state (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2017). This meeting was the clea-
rest voicing of UK policy, and acts as an invaluable source for showing what solution to 
the crisis Britain desired. Their policy was to push for the return of Rohingya refugees 
through a bilateral (Myanmar-Bangladesh) agreement alongside international observation 
and UN human rights access. This was intended to create an environment in which the 
Rohingya could feel secure, but also add international expertise on the ground to help 
both Rohingya and participating authorities (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2017, Q73).
3 The most comprehensive overview of the historic and current political and humanitarian situations in which 
the Rohingya find themselves can be found in Ibrahim, 2018.
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The term ‘repatriation’ is itself problematic. Philippe Ther in his 2015 work The dark 
Side of Nation States highlighted how refugee repatriation has historically been synony-
mous to ethnic cleansing, defined by the UN as:
a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-
inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geo-
graphic areas (Ther, 2016, p. 2; “Definitions: Ethnic cleansing”, n.d.).
Ethnic cleansing has been widely applied to Myanmar’s violent campaign in Rakhine 
state, but the term could also be applied if the Rohingya were to be forcibly returned to 
Myanmar from Bangladesh’s refugee camp in Cox’s Bazar.4 As Ther argues, ‘population 
transfer’ is euphemistic for ethnic cleansing when the UN definition is applied, as its lite-
ral meaning is to forcibly remove a group from a given area. In order to avoid this, Britain 
made it clear that all repatriation should be voluntary and that the Rohingya themselves 
should be allowed to choose whether or not to return. This avoided the possibility of 
a new, internationally backed phase of ethnic cleansing occurring as a result, but itself 
created underlying issues which made the application of Britain’s policy questionable.
It must also be noted that in Field’s evidence to the FAC he hinted at other policy op-
tions at the UK’s disposal. Threat of International Criminal Court (ICC) involvement was 
described as part of Britain’s “diplomatic armoury” (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2017, 
Q76). Mr Field however made the bemusing claim that if refugees did indeed return, then 
discussions on ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity as prosecutable crimes wou-
ld “disappear into the background” (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2017, Q73). Britain saw 
the return of refugees as a goal which, if achieved, would mean prosecution or other 
policy options could be forgotten. This is because Britain’s policy is fundamentally a di-
plomatic compromise. In making this compromise, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office 
(FCO) aimed for a quick fix to the Rohingya question, repatriating refugees before they 
could forget about the 2017 affair as soon as possible. Their goal was to avoid escalation 
which could have forced the government’s hand in the direction of intervention, if it was 
that Myanmar’s actions were accepted as crimes against humanity or genocide (Foreign 
Affairs Committee, 2017, Q81).5 Unlike in other crises such as Sierra Leone in 2000, Afg-
hanistan in 2001 or Iraq in 2003, Britain had no wider interests in the security of Myanmar 
or indeed the Rohingya in Rakhine state, and so repatriation was seen as a sufficient fix.6 
Britain had no real interest in escalating the perceived severity in the plight of the Rohin-
gya, even if victims themselves wanted justice. Clearly, the British government did not 
believe it had a moral obligation to punish those guilty of the most horrific crimes. It was 
thus unsurprising that the government was happy to ignore any discussions on internatio-
nal crimes once ethnic cleansing began in August 2017.
Mr Field justified Britain’s approach by saying that if refugees did not return, the Myan-
mar military would be seen to have “won” (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2017, Q123). In 
other words, if new homes in safer states away from Myanmar were found for the Ro-
hingya, then the Burmese authorities could see this as a successful campaign with Rak-
hine state having been ‘cleansed’. On the surface, this approach could make sense with 
regards to avoiding future maltreatment of minorities, but in reality Mr Field was implying 
4 UN application of ‘ethnic cleansing’ term in ‘Army offensive aimed at preventing return of Rohingya’ (“Army 
offensive aimed at preventing return of Rohingya”, 2017); Population transfer in Ther, 2016, p. 2.
5 States have an obligation to take action in cases of genocide under the 1948 Genocide Convention. 
6 Wider interests include securing oil, mineral or other economic incentives with intervention. Intervention 
or further action against Myanmar would be purely on humanitarian grounds, whereas the Sierra Leone, 
Afghanistan and Iraq examples all also included additional incentives.
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that denying the Myanmar authorities victory was more significant than forming a policy 
which would help the Rohingya people. Given this argument, the remaining options for 
the UK government were thus to either make the refugee camps of Cox’s Bazar perma-
nent, or push for the return of 600,000 people to what may have remained of their homes 
in Myanmar. As Mr Field also made it clear in the FAC hearing that refugee camps should 
never be made permanent, repatriation became the British government’s goal early on 
(Foreign Affairs Committee, 2017, Q117). This approach had the added benefit to the 
British government of removing the question of rehousing Rohingya Muslims abroad—
an option undoubtedly deemed politically undesirable for a right of centre party in the 
Islamophobic political climate of the UK and wider political West.7 It would have been 
a struggle for Britain to negotiate the granting of refugee status to the Rohingya in other 
states, without agreeing to accept many people themselves. 
Britain’s approach was ultimately aimed at a return to the status quo, one in which any 
persecution of Rohingya was kept within Burmese borders.8 Mr Field not only showed 
a lack of desire on the part of the government to help the Rohingya people in the form of 
safe, permanent residency, but also all but ignored the crimes of the authorities in Myan-
mar. In addition, the British government ignored the underlying, long-term issues faced 
by the Rohingya at the hands of the Burmese government which made repatriation unde-
sirable for the Rohingya themselves, and was advised against by human rights groups.9 
The UK’s policy was formed with the experience of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar as 
a sideline issue. 
ThE ROhINgyA: LIFE  IN myANmAR
Britain’s approach to forming a response to the Myanmar crisis evidently had fundamen-
tal flaws from the outset. Their decision was to push for the creation of an environment 
in which Rohingya would want to return. This voluntary aspect of policy was a necessity, 
but itself causes great issues with how realistic a policy this is. In no way does this mean 
that the Rohingya are to blame for this difficulty, but instead that the UK should have 
taken more seriously the Rohingya’s experience in the decades preceding August 2017. 
The history of the Rohingya is understudied, complex and highly politicised. According 
to the Rohingya, Rakhine state has been their home for centuries (Galache, 2014, p. 2).10 
On the contrary, ethnically Burmese Rakhine citizens and the Burmese government ar-
gue that the Rohingya settled in Myanmar from Bengal during Britain’s colonisation of 
South Asia and have been illegally migrating into Myanmar since it gained independen-
ce in 1947 (Galache, 2014, p. 2; Ibrahim, 2018). Such debates have been ongoing sin-
ce Myanmar’s independence, and disputes over the identity of fleeing people disrupted 
Myanmar-Bangladesh bilateral talks as early as 1978 (Anand, 1978, p. 1000). It appears 
that the truth lies somewhere in between, and Carlos Sardiña Galache argues that si-
multaneously many Rohingya have historic roots in the region and many also crossed 
7 Britain’s recent history has seen a trend of anti-immigration and anti-refugee stances, particularly with regar-
ds to Muslim refugees (Sloan, 2017). 
8 Persecution had been documented frequently since 1948, with peaks in 1978, the early 1990s and 2012 
(Anand, 1978, pp. 1100–1101).
9 Amnesty International and other human rights groups warned about what the Rohingya would be returning 
to (“Myanmar: Rohingya returns unthinkable until apartheid structure is dismantled”, 2017). 
10 The history of the Rohingya is covered in the initial chapters of Ibrahim, 2018. 
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during the colonial period (Galache, 2014, p. 11). In addition, Galache refutes the very 
idea that nationality should be framed in the way it is under Burmese law, that being that 
groups are defined by residency before the colonial period. Identity defined in this way 
should be applied to borders drawn after independence, especially given the amount of 
demographic changes which occur under imperialism (Galache, 2014, p. 4). This way of 
framing race and ethnicity in Myanmar is regarded as a hangover from British institutiona-
lisation of such ideas during its time as coloniser (Galache, 2014, p. 4). 
Because of this racialised dynamic, it is perhaps unsurprising that both sides have 
exaggerated their versions of the Rohingya story, but it is the Burmese Buddhist majori-
ty which has translated their version into violent, state-run policy. That being said, there 
exists a low-level of Islamic insurgency in Myanmar to which the Rohingya have been 
linked, though this is closely related to state persecution against Rohingya Muslims since 
1982 (Ibrahim, 2018, p. 51). On some level at least, Myanmar’s operations were aiming 
to remove Islamist insurgency completely, and this is what Burmese authorities used to 
justify their actions (Asrar, 2017b). Even so, Nikki Hayley, United States Ambassador to 
the UN, amongst others have highlighted that Myanmar’s actions went far and beyond 
‘counterinsurgency’, and so applying this as an explanation for ethnic cleansing is not ap-
propriate (Haley, 2017). Myanmar’s narrative of counterinsurgency thus had the twofold 
flaw of being completely disproportionate as a response to violence, and also such violen-
ce being a direct consequence of their own inhumane government policy.
Until 1982, the Burmese government had in fact recognised the Rohingya as an eth-
nic minority, before the autocratic ruling military restructured the state’s approach toward 
minority groups (Green et al., 2015, p. 7). This was the institutionalisation of the scape-
goating of the Rohingya, as they were then blamed for the existence of rifts between 
conflicting minority groups in Myanmar (Galache, 2014).11 Evidently, the rift between Bur-
mese society and the Rohingya is vast, and not only are they stigmatised by the ethnically 
Burmese majority, but also by other minority groups in Myanmar—singled out by their uni-
que circumstance of being neither linguistically Burmese nor religiously Buddhist. In 2014, 
Maung Zarni and Alice Cowley concluded that Myanmar had undergone a “slow-burning 
state-led process of deliberate destruction of the Rohingya as a population since 1978”, 
suggesting that the 1982 laws were a part of an ongoing, long-term campaign against the 
Rohingya which has filtered down into everyday society (Zarni & Cowley, 2014, p. 751).12 
This in part explains other groups’ involvement in violence over a number of decades, as 
well as their significant role in the ethnic cleansing campaign which began in August 2017.
Queen Mary, University of London’s (QMUL) International State Crime Initiative (ISCI) 
published countdown to Annihilation in 2015, which utilised research such as that by Zarni 
and Cowley to forewarn of these divisions and the potential for violent consequences, ad-
ding to on-the-ground research conducted by the ISCI themselves (Green et al., 2015). In 
their research, ISCI applied Daniel Feierstein’s stages of genocide from his work genocide 
as a Social practice (Feierstein, 2014). ISCI adapted Feierstein’s work into six stages which 
they argued can be used to show that a ‘genocidal process’ was taking place in Myanmar 
(Green et al., 2015, p. 23). In their conclusion, Penny Green et al. argue that Myanmar had 
followed four of the first six stages of genocide to the letter up to 2015 (Green et al., 2015, 
p. 99). This meant that Burmese authorities had stigmatised, harassed, isolated and syste-
11 Rakhine can refer to either the state, or the ethnicity of the state’s majority population. 
12 Genocide was also forewarned by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2015 (Ibrahim, 
2018, p. 125).
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matically weakened the Rohingya population over a number of years, with the final two 
stages predicted to be genocide and “symbolic enactment” (Green et al., 2015, p. 99).13 
As early as 1993, William McGowan linked Burmese treatment of Rohingya to ethnic cle-
ansing in Yugoslavia, showing how institutionalised anti-Rohingya violence had existed in 
Myanmar for decades prior to 2017 (McGowan, 1993, p. 47). Persecution was institutiona-
lised with the 1982 laws, but was subsequently implemented in decades worth of policies 
designed to make life for the Rohingya people unbearable. 
This violent campaign came to a head with violence described by the ISCI as 
“Myanmar’s Kristallnacht” (Green et al., 2015, p. 74). In 2012, Buddhist civilians were 
bussed to Rohingya villages and sections of cities so they could beat, rape and kill Rohin-
gya Muslims en masse (Green et al., 2015, p. 74).14 The violence resulted in some Rohin-
gya being forced into camps, separated from ethnoreligious Rakhine people and tightly 
controlled by Burmese security forces (Green et al., 2015, p. 80). Following isolation, the 
next step in Feierstein’s process, along alarmingly similar lines to the stages adopted by 
Nazi Germany during the Holocaust, was predicted to be genocide. 
Myanmar’s Kristallnacht in part explains why 400,000 refugees were already resi-
ding in Cox’s Bazar before August 2017. Not only was there increased organised vio-
lence in 2012, but a low level of violence of Rohingya was carried out over a number of 
years—shown by numerous, corroborating documentaries (such as those by the BBC’s 
Newsnight and Al Jazeera News) (myanmar: Are crimes against humanity taking place?, 
2017; The  hidden  genocide, 2013). In addition, the ISCI’s research highlights how the 
2012 violence was a bureaucratically coordinated action which achieved its aim of forcing 
Rohingya into isolated zones within cities, and ‘internal refugee camps’ (or more simply, 
concentration camps) outside them (Green et al., 2015, p. 82).15 Such camps and the 
ethnoreligious segregation they imposed were revealed by Al Jazeera World in a docu-
mentary in August 2017—sixteen days before ethnic cleansing began in Rakhine state 
(Hindawi, Kishk, & Grace, 2017). 
The August 2017 campaign was thus not a short term issue for policymakers to con-
sider. Britain’s policy of pushing for voluntary repatriation suggested that the conditions 
needed to be right to allow for Rohingya to return. However, given the decades of per-
secution and weakening of the Rohingya minority in independent postcolonial Myanmar, 
saying that they would be returning to an “insecure situation”, as Field put it, was an 
understatement of the largest degree (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2017, Q76). The Bri-
tish government provided no means by which the stigmatisation and state-sponsored se-
gregation of Rohingya within Myanmar itself could be overcome. It appears that, given 
the severity of Myanmar’s treatment of Rohingya, British policymakers were relying upon 
a combination of desperation and nostalgia on the part of the Rohingya to take them-
selves back across the border. Once more, it appears that Britain pushed for a return to 
the status quo—a situation where persecution may be ongoing but not impacting other 
states. What they barely considered, however, was that the Rohingya would be returning 
to a status quo designed at least to separate Rohingya in what Amnesty International 
amongst others have referred to as apartheid, and at most annihilate them altogether as 
the ISCI had warned in 2014 (“Myanmar: Rohingya trapped in dehumanising apartheid re-
gime”, 2017). Britain’s policy also ignored the fact that violence in August was not simply 
13 “Symbolic enactment” is described to entail the removal of the victim group from societal memory.
14 Burmese and Rakhine civilians are distinguishable by their albeit closely related languages, yet both profess 
Buddhism.
15 Refugee camps discussed in Ibrahim, 2018, p. 89.
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carried out by Burmese authorities, but also by civilians—the Rohingya’s former neighbo-
urs. The picture of Britain’s policy as unrealistic thus begins to crystallise.
myANmAR: AccEpTINg BAcK AN uNWANTEd pEOpLE?
Over a number of decades, Myanmar carried out the state-sponsored stigmatisation 
and isolation of Rohingya, culminating in the 2017 ethnic cleansing and accompanying 
mass murder and systematic rape. Myanmar stripped Rohingya of citizenship rights and 
removed their identification papers in order to prevent them from working, freely mov-
ing, gaining education, accessing healthcare and more (Hindawi et al., 2017, 11:00). From 
a state level, Burmese authorities sought to separate, demonise and vilify the Rohingya 
community, resulting in a popular belief that the Rohingya deserve the violence which 
they received (Ibrahim, 2018, p. 14). 
Violence against Rohingya was, and remains, a policy supported nationwide by a range 
of minority groups alongside the Buddhist majority and ruling government (Hindawi et al., 
2017, 03:40).16 Removing Rohingya from Myanmar was a popular policy, which is reflec-
ted in part by Rakhine citizens’ involvement in violence against Rohingya. Local Rakhine 
people looted houses, razed villages, raped women and killed adults and children both 
before and during Myanmar’s 2017 ethnic cleansing (Green et al., 2015, p. 74). These 
actions were not just a consequence of Myanmar’s government policy, but a constituent 
part of it. Burmese authorities have consistently shown that they do not want the Rohin-
gya in their country, and so have actively encouraged violence on the part of both security 
forces and Burmese citizens in order to induce fear into Rohingya communities and force 
them to leave. 
Alison Ruby Reid-Cunningham has argued that rape (such as that carried out during 
the 2017 ethnic cleansing campaign) is used in genocidal acts to symbolise the domina-
tion of an aggressor culture over their victims (Reid-Cunningham, 2008, p. 281).17 Reid-
Cunningham writes that rape “represents a conquest of the woman by the rapist and, 
by symbolic extension, dominance of the raping culture over the raped culture” (Reid-
Cunningham, 2008, p. 293).18 In this case, the propaganda fed to Burmese people from 
the Myanmar government and prominent Buddhist figures over a number of decades 
led to a paranoia amongst Burmese Buddhists that Muslims were ‘taking over’, and that 
Islam was synonymous to terrorism (Hindawi et al., 2017, 17:30).19 In violence against 
the Rohingya prior to 2017, rape became a frequent method of choice, symbolising the 
domination of Buddhism over Islam—fighting back against the ‘invading terrorists’.20 In 
August 2017, this tactic was implemented on a genocidal scale, with Burmese troops 
and local Buddhists joining in on the mass rape and sexual mutilation of Rohingya wo-
men and girls. Stories describing these acts were consistent from day one of the August 
16 Burmese human rights protesters deny knowledge of abuse against Rohingya.
17 Reid-Cunningham uses the examples of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1996), Rwanda (1994) and Darfur, Sudan 
(2003-present).
18 On the individual level, the rapist asserts “monarch-like power” over the victim, which translates to ethnic 
domination when rape is carried out on a genocidal scale; see Winkler, 1991, p. 12.
19 Terrorism does exist in Myanmar, albeit on a small scale, yet is likely to rise with the continued persecution 
and resulting desperation of Rohingya peoples (Ibrahim, 2018, p. 125).
20 The idea of Islam taking over fits the narrative of some strands of militant Buddhism which aims for security 
through the elimination of other religions, and Buddhist Monks in Myanmar have been leading voices in the 
persecution of the Rohingya (Ibrahim, 2018, p. 3.
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2017 campaign, with rape being intentionally utilised by Burmese authorities to symbo-
lise of their power over the Rohingya. As Catherine A. Mackinnon writes, “sexually de-
stroying the women of [a group] in these ways destroys the group” (Mackinnon, 2005, 
p. 338). Rape thus became a method for destroying the Rohingya without the need to 
exterminate them completely. Indeed, genocidal rape leaves surviving group members 
both physically and psychologically destroyed—rendering them powerless (Mackinnon, 
2005, p. 338).
Further to this, in spite of hundreds of thousands of consistent stories the Burmese 
authorities denied the violence in Rakhine state once it began in August 2017. Aung San 
Suu Kyi, de jure leader and the West’s nominated flag-bearer of democracy in Myanmar, 
rejected stories of rape and claims of ethnic cleansing from the outset, instead stating 
that there existed “a huge iceberg of misinformation” and lies from “terrorists” in Rak-
hine state.21 This was a mere extension of the previous denial of Rohingya’s existence—
denial that violence against them had occurred at all. Azeem Ibrahim has argued that Suu 
Kyi’s background made this denial unsurprising, as Suu Kyi represents a ruling class in 
Myanmar which has zero sympathy for historic Rohingya strife (Ibrahim, 2018, p. 139). 
Indeed, as early as 1978 Myanmar was claiming that those fleeing Rakhine to Bangla-
desh were illegal ‘Bengali immigrants’ returning home (Anand, 1978, p. 1000). This un-
dermined the first Myanmar-Bangladesh bilateral agreement of 1992, as Bangladesh also 
denied responsibility for Rohingya refugees fleeing violence, meaning the Rohingya were 
stateless with neither side accepting them as their own citizens (Anand, 1978, p. 1000). 
In addition, although Myanmar has been ‘transitioning’ to democracy since 2008, the pro
-democracy half of government has deep familial links to the formerly autocratic military 
(Ibrahim, 2018, p. 139). Suu Kyi herself came from a family whose members were at 
the very top of independent Burmese politics, meaning she is more intertwined with the 
power-sharing military than many of her supporters in the West would like to believe 
(Ibrahim, 2018, p. 139).
That being said, Aung San Suu Kyi’s half of the government has been said to have had 
a minimal role in the 2017 violence itself, with observers including the British government 
placing the blame on the political National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) and Tat-
madaw.22 Britain saw a complete removal of the military from power as a step toward 
securing rights for the Rohingya minority. However, in the case of the ethnic cleansing 
Suu Kyi was culpable and, as Ibrahim suggests, is as guilty allowing the persecution of 
the Rohingya to continue as the NDSC (Ibrahim, 2018, p. 139). Suu Kyi denied the violen-
ce was ongoing, and though the military implemented out the policy, Suu Kyi’s evasion 
of specificity on the topic of violence in Rakhine renders her complicit—especially when 
considering her refusal to publicly condemn the Tatmadaw’s actions and at times denying 
them altogether. This is a result of her complicity in the continuation of state-sponsored 
violence against the Rohingya, which intensified rather than subsided once the shift to 
democracy began (Ibrahim, 2018, p. 79). On September 19th 2017, Suu Kyi stated that 
she condemned “all human rights abuses”, yet indiscreetly referenced villages that re-
mained intact, rather than those which had been destroyed (myanmar: Suu Kyi’s first na-
tional speech on crisis, 2017). Suu Kyi’s use of the terms “fake news” and “misinforma-
tion” countered the idea that the Burmese military attacked the Rohingya, and reenforced 
21 Safi, M. ‘Aung San Suu Kyi claims ‘terrorists’ are misinforming world about Myanmar violence’, The guard-
ian, 6 September 2017; Ibrahim discusses the West’s obsession with identifiable political heroes and vil-
lains, instead arguing that Suu Kyi’s position is far less glamorous and more nuanced (Ibrahim, 2018, p. 2).
22 Ibrahim offers an excellent overview on the history of the Myanmar government (Ibrahim, 2018, pp. 17–53).
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claims made by security services that the Rohingya burned their own villages and killed 
their own people (“Rohingya Crisis: Suu Kyi says ‘fake news helping terrorists’”, 2017).
A further dynamic in this case is that under Burmese law, once a house has been 
razed, the ground on which it stood becomes government property (Lewis, 2017). This 
means that the razing of villages had the two-fold effect of removing the Rohingya them-
selves and legally giving their property to the state. Figure 1 is taken from a selection of 
satellite images widely distributed by human rights groups in September 2017, showing 
that the world knew of the razing of Rohingya villages from the start of the campaign of 
ethnic cleansing. Images of the village of Tula Toli epitomise what occurred across Rak-
hine state from August 25th 2017, as the homes of Rohingya Muslims were completely 
destroyed and their inhabitants either massacred, raped or forced to flee. Burmese ho-
using law suggests that Myanmar saw the razing of villages as the best way to remove 
the remaining Rohingya from relatively ‘free’ areas and villages, forcing them into either 
newly controlled camps in Rakhine state or across the Naf river to neighbouring Bangla-
desh. When combined with the decades of human rights destruction for Rohingya, the 
systematic campaign which began in August appears to have been calculated to lead to 
one of these two situations. For Myanmar, they now had the ability to go into bilateral 
talks with the mindset that it does not matter whether the Rohingya return or not. Either 
they stay abroad and are someone else’s problem, or they return to new concentration 
camps in which they can be easily controlled by authorities. The UN raised this issue in 
2017, stating that Myanmar’s actions were designed to prevent the return of the Rohin-
gya (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2017).
The final point in this regard is that none of the previous repatriation agreements have 
solved the Rohingya crisis. Agreements between Myanmar and Bangladesh have been 
signed in the past but their impact has been minimal. Britain’s focus on bilateral talks 
avoids tackling the issues surrounding repatriation, ensuring instead that they are not ac-
cused of interfering in other states’ affairs. Given the success rate (or lack thereof) of pre-
Figure 1.  Satellite image comparison: Tula Toli then and now. (Source: The 
Guardian/Amnesty).  
Guardian/Ancestry)
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vious bilateral agreements, Britain’s policy with regard to shifting the attitude of Burmese 
authorities is not a realistic one. Rather than simply sit back and wait for an agreement, 
Britain would have needed to see evidence of changes to previous agreements on repa-
triation in order for it to be successful. This was a blatantly obvious issue given previous 
failures, yet Britain made a choice not to tackle the problem. One man, Mohammad Yus-
suf, was repatriated in 1993 under one such agreement, yet ended up fleeing once more 
due to restrictions on citizenship rights (“Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh fear repatria-
tion to Myanmar”, 2017, 01:55). “My heart cries and asks why I can’t go home”, Yus-
suf said, saying that the Myanmar government had taken away his freedom (“Rohingya 
refugees in Bangladesh fear repatriation to Myanmar”, 2017, 01:55). Myanmar may have 
taken back some Rohingya following past agreements, but the situation once they retur-
ned was as grave if not worse than when they left. Britain never considered these issues 
thoroughly enough, instead pushing an unrealistic solution which would put the Rohingya 
back under the control of a state whose politics is designed to persecute them. 
Given the approach of Myanmar toward their Rohingya population, Britain’s hopes of 
repatriating refugees were not realistic. For this to happen, Burmese authorities would 
have needed a complete ideological shift away from one of decades of discrimination and 
outright denial of Rohingya existence and right to reside, and also provide them with new 
securities and rights which allow them to lead free lives. There was never any evidence 
of a shift. By the time of the November agreement the military still controlled Rakhine 
state, and authorities were legal possession of the former lands of the Rohingya. Myan-
mar made it impossible for them to return to their homes, and were indifferent as to 
whether they remained in Cox’s Bazar or return to new concentration camps in Rakhine. 
In either case, the Rohingya would be non-existent or systematically weakened to the ex-
tent that the Myanmar authorities controlled them entirely. Britain never addressed these 
issues, meaning their policy was totally unrealistic.
ThE ROhINgyA ExpERIENcE OF EThNIc cLEANSINg
Finally, what must be considered and has remained absent in Britain’s policy was the 
opinion of the Rohingya themselves. Myanmar’s policy developments resulted in one of 
the most violent episodes of ethnic cleansing since the term was first defined by the 
United Nations in 1994 (“Definitions: Ethnic cleansing”, n.d.). The British government did 
mention the severity of the violence when laying out their policy intentions, yet appeared 
to ignore what this meant for the individual Rohingya people who had experienced violen-
ce first hand, and how this would influence their own intentions to return home.23 Britain 
did not consider that some Rohingya could not bare to return to Myanmar following their 
experience of ethnic cleansing. 
Attacks on Rohingya were described by victims as being perpetrated by the military in 
conjunction with the local non-Muslim population, whether that be the Burmese majori-
ty or other ethnolinguistic groups. The violence Rohingya experienced was some of the 
worst imaginable, and it is obvious that the perpetrators control and provide security to 
the places Britain wants them to return to.
23 Although brought up during the FAC meeting, this point was only brushed upon and the severity of this issue 
with regards to Britain’s policy was simply not considered (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2017, Q121–123).
Page 12 of 17
Interviews with Rohingya Muslims taking refuge in Cox’s Bazar refugee camp were 
consistent and frequent from the start of Myanmar’s campaign on August 25th 2017. 
In a channel 4 News documentary, a child named Mohammad Faisal spoke of how he 
had seen father shot, and a mourning woman told how her three daughters, two sons 
and husband been burned to death when their home was razed (Rohingya documentary: 
“A boy with no name for a people with no identity”, 2017, 16:05 and 06:40 respectively). 
Al Jazeera published an article in October which told of how a woman named Rajuma 
saw her baby thrown into a fire before she was gang-raped by Burmese soldiers (“Rohin-
gya survivor: The army threw my baby into a fire”, 2017). Mass rape and infanticide were 
common themes described by Rohingya who escaped to Bangladesh, and the violence 
carried out in Rakhine was undoubtedly gendered.
In the ethnic cleansing of Rohingya, rape was not only used to symbolise the domi-
nation of Islam by Buddhism, but also used to ensure the victims do not want to return 
to Myanmar. Reid-Cunningham has further argued that rape intends to cause psycholo-
gical harm to not only the women, but also the rest of the community in which they 
live—damaging the ‘purity’ of a given community and rendering all members (not just 
the rape victims themselves) traumatised by the experience (Reid-Cunningham, 2008, 
p. 281). By utilising systematic rape, Myanmar’s military was ensuring the psychological 
barriers needed to overcome in order for victims to return to Myanmar were as harsh as 
possible. Communities were torn apart and tainted by the memory of the rape of Rohin-
gya women, which led to thousands of pregnancies conceived through genocidal rape 
(Beech, 2018). In cases of rape, the babies born are a constant reminder of the ordeal 
their mothers went through, and are often cast aside by the damaged community (Be-
ech, 2018). As Jonathan Miller stated from Cox’s Bazar, the stories told to journalists and 
aid workers were consistent from every single person landing on the Bangladesh side of 
the Naf river—stories which told of the mass rape of Rohingya women by the military, 
and also by locals (Rohingya documentary: “A boy with no name for a people with no 
identity”, 2017, 06:50). In short, Myanmar’s campaign of rape was designed to ensure 
Rohingya communities did not wish to return, with reminders of Buddhist mass violence 
and accompanying rape living on in the form of rape-conceived children. 
As a result of the trauma and extreme violence Rohingya underwent, humanitarian aid 
organisations in the refugee camp worked on psychological rehabilitation (Gaynor, 2017). 
On the one hand, this is shows the success of international organisations, funded by do-
nations such as those from Britain (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2017, Q85). On the other, 
it highlights another huge issue with Britain’s policy of refugee repatriation. The violence 
described by victims were so consistent and so frequent that the majority of Rohingya 
were rendered fearful of returning to their ancestral homes. Rohingya in Cox’s Bazar, as 
well as those taking refuge in India an elsewhere, repeatedly told of their fear of returning 
to Myanmar as a result of psychological trauma.24 A representative of the UN High Com-
mission for Refugees (UNHCR) told Al Jazeera English of how the “general feeling” in 
Cox’s Bazar was that people feared that they would be returning to a life of persecution, 
with the added trauma of having had women of Rohingya communities raped and mutila-
ted and many of their friends and family members killed (“Rohingya refugees in Bangla-
desh fear repatriation to Myanmar”, 2017).
24 The hidden genocide (2013); Rohingya documentary: “A boy with no name for a people with no identity” 
(2017) show victims voicing such opinions.
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Evidently, getting a million Rohingya to voluntarily return under current conditions wo-
uld be an impossibility, which was undoubtedly the intention of the Burmese military in 
their use of mass rape.25 In the Foreign Affairs Committee meeting, Field was asked abo-
ut this issue by Mike Gapes MP, who questioned how anyone could ever return having 
experienced such atrocities (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2017, Q121). Field had no ade-
quate response to this, saying that he was aware of such a situation but that the goal 
should be returning Rohingya to the “land of their forefathers” (Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee, 2017, Q101). Having survived the violence in August, and having been persecuted 
for so long, it is not surprising that many Rohingya do not wish to return. In terms of the 
Rohingya’s opinion, then, return would only be an option if the right conditions were cre-
ated by Burmese authorities, with the oversight of international organisations as desired 
by Britain. However, Myanmar’s attitude was far from compliant, and their track record 
shows that Britain’s hope for this to occur was entirely unrealistic. 
cONcLuSION
The repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar was not a realistic policy. In order for 
it to occur, Myanmar would have needed to provide a safe and secure environment, al-
low international observation and remove its military whilst simultaneously backtracking 
on decades of state-planned stigmatisation, persecution and isolation. QMUL’s excellent 
research in 2015 showed the application of Feierstein’s stages of genocide was possible 
in this case, and Myanmar followed those stages to the letter until the ethnic cleansing 
campaign began in August. The likelihood of Myanmar reversing its policy was, and re-
mains, minimal, and the continued denial of the very existence of Rohingya by Burmese 
authorities added to the issues undermining Britain’s policy. Myanmar showed that it did 
not want the Rohingya to be a part of its nation, and any return ‘home’ following ethnic 
cleansing would have be to concentration camps, cut off from Burmese society. 
This essay has analysed Britain’s policy on two main levels, those being the perspec-
tive of Burmese authorities and the position of the Rohingya themselves. The campaign 
in August 2017 was ethnic cleansing—using extreme violence or, terror-inspired means, 
to force the ethnoreligious Rohingya group to leave Rakhine state. The frequency of rape 
in this case links closely to those discussed by Reid-Cunningham in the cases of Yugo-
slavia and Sudan and add further to the argument that Myanmar’s campaign was aimed 
at preventing the Rohingya’s return. This campaign caused unimaginable harm both phy-
sically and psychologically to the victims, and when added to the decades-long stripping 
of human-rights they experienced meant the Rohingya were unlikely to want to return to 
their ancestral land without unprecedented societal change in Myanmar.
It would be safe to conclude that Britain’s approach toward the ethnic cleansing of 
Rohingya was excessively diplomatic and overly optimistic. However, it would also not 
be going too far to argue that Britain itself did not believe in the policy it was following. 
What the FCO did was outline an ideal scenario which Britain wanted to see, rather than 
develop one which could be workable. When spelling out the UK’s policy, Field himself 
highlighted the question as to what it was the Rohingya would be returning (Foreign Af-
25 One million a result of the combination of 400,000 taking refuge in Bangladesh prior to the August 2017 
ethnic cleansing, and the 600,000 forced to flee during it. 
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fairs Committee, 2017, Q73). Myanmar had made it clear in its actions from the start that 
Rohingya’s ancestral homes would not be returned, with property being looted and (un-
der Burmese law) the land on which homes previously stood being repossessed by the 
government. Of the three policy options immediately available to Britain, they chose the 
one which would require the minimum involvement for the UK. Rather than build a policy 
which would help the Rohingya people, they chose to steer as far away from interference 
as possible. 
Not only was Britain’s policy unrealistic, it was knowingly so. The consequences of 
such an approach could have serious ramifications if either the Rohingya are left to resi-
de in disease-ridden, restrictive, temporary camps or they return to a state which regar-
ds them as disposable. Admittedly, the first stage of Britain’s policy was achieved with 
a Myanmar-Bangladesh agreement, with UNHCR’s involvement being discussed in ne-
gotiations. However, repatriation was clearly a fantasy which even if made reality would 
result in hundreds of thousands of people living in concentration camps in Myanmar. The 
homes of the Rohingya no longer exist, and now the only options are refugee camps in 
Bangladesh, or Myanmar-controlled concentration camps in Myanmar. 
Unless the UK could provide a situation where Myanmar reinstates the Rohingya as 
a minority, allows them rights to work, education and movement, rebuilds razed villages, 
withdraws security forces who perpetrated the violence and makes efforts to peace-build 
between minorities, then their policy of refugee repatriation was wholly unrealistic. These 
will clearly never happen. Even if some Rohingya do return following the Myanmar-Ban-
gladesh agreement, what awaits them in Myanmar is likely to be a continuation of what 
the ISCI observed in 2015, with genocide a perhaps likely future stage for those Rohingya 
who remain under Burmese control. 
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